This paper analyses aggregate household wealth in Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, the UK and the US. Building on a new data set for the time span 1980-2011, we discuss the trends in household financial assets in the last thirty years, the reasons for differences across countries, the tendency towards convergence, the economic interpretation of breaks in time series and the effects of the recent financial crisis. We also comment on the evolution of household debt and real assets. In discussing the empirical evidence, the paper summarises some of the recent literature on household wealth. JEL Classification: E01; E21; G20.
Introduction
Household wealth is a traditional subject of economic analysis, as testified, inter alia, by the large literature on wealth effects, individual risk aversion, the characteristics and evolution of financial systems, and on the links between portfolio choices, population ageing and retirement saving.
1 A broader area of interest relates to the evaluation of the well-being of societies.
2 Lately, the debate on the causes and consequences of the financial crisis that began in 2007 and exploded in 2008 has spurred further interest in household wealth. 3 The crisis occurred after a period of rising household indebtedness and heightened volatility on financial markets. Most importantly, the crisis determined a destruction of household wealth. Hence the interest in longer series in financial accounts, which are the privileged macro source on household assets and liabilities.
Relying on a new data set for Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, the UK and the US, this paper studies the level and composition of aggregate financial wealth and discusses why financial asset sizes differ across countries. We analyse the main instruments in which individuals invest: deposits, securities other than shares, shares and other equity, and insurance technical reserves. We also look at convergence issues and at the role of institutional investors. Finally, we discuss the evidence on household debt and real assets.
The paper is based on a realignment of series on household financial assets and liabilities following the introduction of the System of National Accounts in 1993 (SNA93) 4 for the time span 1980-2011. Based on the SNA93 and on the 1995 European System of Accounts (ESA95) classification, we have engaged in a statistical reconstruction reconciling the series preceding SNA93 with the series that have followed since 1995. The process is illustrated in detail in the Appendix. 5 We do not study household-level data on wealth (on this topic see ECB 2013).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyses the evolution of aggregate household financial assets. Section 3 discusses the main factors explaining the differences across countries. Section 4 looks at the national composition of financial wealth. Section 5 studies the issue of convergence. Section 6 examines household debt and net financial wealth. Section 7 compares household real assets. Paragraph 8 contains the main conclusions. The Appendix focuses on the methodology used. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the stock of household financial assets relative to GDP from 1980 to 2011. The US, UK, Canada and Japan stand out as having, throughout the period, the highest ratios, while Spain, Germany and France have the lowest, with Italy positioned somewhat in the middle. 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 We have distinguished six periods, with a special focus on the most recent years.
The evolution of household financial assets
• The quiet eighties. From 1980 to 1990, there was smooth growth of financial assets in most of the countries considered. In that decade financial repression measures -such as credit ceilings, high bank reserve requirements, limits on capital movements -were common and curbed the increase of financial assets. On the contrary the growth of household wealth was stronger in Japan until the end of the 1980s, as a result of high savings, the boom in asset prices and the good performance of the economy. Then, around the beginning of the 1990s, the economic crisis struck -resulting in the lost decade of 1991 -2001 (Hayashi and Prescott 2002 -and financial assets were negatively affected. Since then in Japan the growth of financial assets has been much smoother than in other countries, due to the general deflationary context.
• The "new economy" and the bubble of [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] . Overall, the growth in financial assets appears to have continued in the early 1990s and accelerated from 1995 to 2000, especially in the US, the UK, Canada and Italy. The acceleration was associated with the performance of the stock market during the years of the Internet bubble. The growth of financial assets was weaker in Germany and Spain, where historically banks have a strong role.
• Figure 2 helps highlight the evolution of financial wealth with reference to specific points in time. The figure confirms that the growth of financial assets was, overall, very strong in the 1990s, following a positive period in the 1980s. Household financial wealth reached its peak in 1999 in most of the countries. Only in France, Germany and Japan were financial assets greater in 2011 than in 1999. Per capita financial assets put the disparities across countries in a somewhat different perspective ( Figure 3) . As in the case of the ratio of financial assets to GDP, the US and Japan show the highest levels, followed by Canada and the UK. By contrast, while Italian households traditionally have a ratio of financial assets to GDP greater than the levels of Germany and France, per capita figures show that France and Germany were in line with Italy in 2011. The performance of the Italian economy has been disappointing in recent years and this result has influenced the ratio of financial wealth to GDP (or to disposable income). 
Why does financial wealth differ across countries?
While a vast literature exists on the determinants of per capita GDP or GDP growth, the same is not true of the determinants of household wealth (notable exceptions are Davies, Sandstrom, Shorrocks and Wolff, 2011; Zinni 2012) . Taking into account the absence of a comprehensive theoretical framework and the existence of endogeneity issues between wealth and other variables, the differences in household financial assets across countries can be linked to four main, interrelated factors: 6
• participation in financial markets;
• social security systems;
• substitution effects between real and financial wealth;
• saving and price effects.
Participation
A first explanation lies in households' participation in financial markets. The percentage of individuals who invest directly in shares is higher in the US, the UK, and Japan than in France, Germany, Italy and Spain . Also, indirect participation in financial markets through mutual funds, pension funds and insurance corporations is higher in the US and the UK.
Given that households are the major owners of shares, at the macro level stock market capitalization may be used as a rough proxy of participation in financial markets. Figure 4 shows the evolution of stock market capitalization in relation to GDP. Trends are quite similar to those presented in Figure 1 . Japan experienced an acceleration of stock market capitalization in the second half of the 1980s and was subsequently affected by the financial crisis and the prolonged stagnation. In the other countries, the increase in stock market capitalization was concentrated in the time span 1995-2000. The subsequent years were dominated by the two crises of 2000-2003 and 2007-2009 and the diversified recoveries: as in the case of financial assets, today's stock market capitalization levels are also far off the peaks of 1999-2000. With the exception of Japan, the figure also shows a clear pattern of hysteresis; the relative rankings of countries by stock market capitalization are today quite similar to thirty years ago. This is partly disappointing for those countries, like Italy, which introduced reforms to improve the corporate governance of quoted firms and to foster the development of the Stock Exchange (see Bianchi and Bianco 2006; Enriques 2009 ).
Households' exposure to equities differs in our countries (Fano 2005) . Correlation coefficients, across time, between household wealth and stock market indices (Table 1) are very high in the UK, the US and Canada, and lower in Japan and Spain, where deposits are crucial in household portfolios. Clearly other factors, including stock market performance, affect total household wealth. 80 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Social security systems
A second reason for country differences in household financial wealth is that public pension schemes -not registered in the current financial accounts -are less generous in the UK and the US than in the euro area countries. Consequently, household financial assets are greater in the UK, the US, Canada and Japan because of the popularity of private pension schemes (see Whitehouse and Queisser 2012 for a survey). This second factor is interrelated with the first, given that private pension and insurance vehicles are powerful engines of greater individual participation in financial markets (see Banks and Wakefield 2003 on the UK).
Substitution vs complementary effects with real assets
A third cause of country differences in financial wealth is households' preference for investing in real assets. For instance household real assets are large in Spain, where financial assets are very low, while they are modest in the US, where financial wealth is highest. This is puzzling because real and financial assets seem complementary in the UK, Italy and France. We will analyze household real wealth in detail in Section 7.
Saving and price effects
In the long run, wealth is linked to the accumulation of savings but in the short run this connection is often difficult to detect. Figures 5a and 5b show that since the 1990s saving dynamics have differed strongly across countries.
7 Savings alone can hardly explain variations in wealth. The propensity to save declined in most cases, and particularly in Italy and Japan, which both started with high levels in the 1990s. Lower interest rates, unrealized capital gains (price effects), increased availability of credit, population ageing and slower growth of disposable income are among the explanations (see de Following the onset of the financial crisis in 2007, saving rates recovered in those countries where households were most affected by high levels of debt: this was the case of the UK and the US (on household indebtedness see Section 6). According to the most recent figures, savings remain higher in the euro area than in the UK, the US, Canada and Japan. It is noteworthy that Germany and France are the only countries where household savings remained fairly stable in the last 15 years. Correlations between the saving rate and wealth were negative in many countries in the 1990s and the 2000s. This is consistent with the idea that in the years of rising share and house prices, i.e. in most of the period from 1995-2007 individuals saved less because their perceived wealth increased: this interpretation applies in particular to the US, the UK and Canada.
8 Table 2 tries to disentangle the two main components of the overall change in the stock of financial wealth. Section A of the table shows the rates of change of financial wealth as a ratio to GDP, as derived from the statistics shown in Figure 1 above. Section B presents net lending and net borrowing by households as a percentage of GDP, i.e. the financial component of savings, as derived from national accounts. Section C highlights the residual component, i.e. the changes in aggregate financial wealth that are not explained by new financial savings. This residual is a mix of components, but price effects play a key role as shown by the high correlation with stock indices.
As underlined above, only a portion of savings is directed towards financial uses, the rest being directed towards non-financial investments and real estate essentially. Net lending by households highlights this financial component of savings. As far as "net lending/net borrowing" figures are concerned, in Canada, the UK, the US and Spain, households were net borrowers for most of the period 2002-2007 while in the other countries households confirmed their traditional role as net lenders. In the same years, in Canada, the UK, the US and Spain, price and other effects were the decisive factors influencing changes in financial wealth.
The composition of financial assets
The analysis of the composition of financial wealth conveys a lot of information on the characteristics of market economies. Figure 6 shows the percentage composition of household financial wealth in our eight countries from 1980 to 2011, taking into account four instruments: deposits; debt securities (i.e. bonds); shares and other equity (including mutual funds); insurance and pension fund products.
9 Table 3 shows a more detailed comparison for the end of 2011.
Deposits. In Germany, Spain, and mostly in Japan deposits have represented the dominant form of household asset over the last 30 years. The percentage share of deposits decreased in most of the countries until 2007. Only in Japan did the deposit component remain steady over time, at more than 50 per cent of total household wealth. Certainly, deposits looked attractive in a permanent scenario of deflation. Moreover, another distinctive characteristic of Japan is the behavior of banks and other intermediaries. They reinvest the funds collected through deposits in bonds issued by the general government: this explains why foreign residents hold only a negligible portion of Japan's large public debt (more than 230 per cent of GDP in 2012; see Hoshi and Ito 2012) . After 2007 the financial crisis was reflected in an expansion of deposits across the board, though in some countries this tendency started as early as 2001 after the burst of the dotcom bubble.
Bonds. Italy has the highest percentage of debt securities held directly by households: during the 1980s and the early 1990s general government securities were predominant in household portfolios while subsequently bonds issued by banks increased their share. In Italy bonds represent 20 per cent of total household financial wealth, while this percentage is smaller than 5 per cent in most of the countries. However, this evidence must be interpreted with caution because households hold bonds indirectly through institutional investors.
Shares and other equity. The combination of shares and other equity (quoted and unquoted shares, mutual fund units, other), also illustrated in Table 3 below for 2011, has always been the most important component of aggregate financial wealth in the US only. The same was true in the early 1990s in France, when the authorities fostered the development of financial markets through reforms (see Schmidt, Hacketal and Tyrell 1999) . Also in Italy from 1997 to 2007 households moved strongly towards Stock Exchange investments (see Filippa and Franzosi 2001 on quoted shares and mutual funds in the second half of the 1990s).
Shares and other equity is a very heterogeneous item: it includes not only quoted shares and mutual fund units, but also unquoted shares and other equity (see Heaton and Lucas 2000 on substitution effects between the different instruments). While quoted shares and mutual funds are important in the US, unquoted shares and other equity are crucial in Italy (because of the large number of small firms owned by individuals), but also in France. Shares and other equity account for a very low percentage of total household wealth in Germany, where the appetite for Stock Exchange investment remains subdued. The low percentage of shares held by households in Japan and the UK is more apparent than real: in these two countries individuals participate in financial markets through life insurance and pension funds.
Insurance and pension funds. An important common feature for all countries and the entire period is the steady expansion of the share of insurance technical reserves. As previously stated, pension funds and life insurance are important holders of bonds and shares on behalf of households. The institutionalization of financial wealth reflects the tendency of households to delegate the management of their assets to pension funds, life insurance and mutual funds (see Fano 2011, pp. 114-116) . As government retreats from full protection of household life-cycle needs, be it for retirement, education, temporary unemployment or health, households need to rely increasingly on their own savings. As well as providing standardized services, institutions may allow investment risk to be pooled and diversified. The institutionalization of savings, however, has given rise to new forms of risk for households beyond traditional market risks -related to the volatility of equities and bonds -and specifically to principal-agent or counterparty risk. While "do it yourself" finance has its drawbacks in terms of shortsightedness and lack of diversification, institutionalized assets also have their own limitations, as the recent crisis has highlighted.
In all the countries, insurance technical reserves are today greater in household portfolios than in the 1980s. The largest stocks of insurance and pension products are found in the UK and the US, where the generosity of State pension schemes is small by international standards. Pension funds and insurance companies are much more numerous in the UK than in the US, where individuals prefer to invest directly or through mutual funds. Intermediate levels of insurance technical reserves are registered in Japan, Germany and France, while low levels prevail in Italy and Spain. 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 It is interesting to take a closer look at mutual funds, insurance products, and pension funds by using a more detailed presentation than that of the current financial accounts (Table 4) . After 2007 the financial turmoil and the related increased volatility in markets negatively affected the share of mutual funds, except for the US. The decline was particularly great in Italy and Spain, and smaller in Germany. In the 2000s life insurance reserves recorded impressive growth in all the continental European countries considered (with the exception of Spain), while they retained a minor role in the US. Funded pension funds have been developing in all the countries, except France, where they are virtually non-existent. France, has "pay-as-you-go" second pillar vehicles, though not to the extent of the US, where they already represent the dominant component of financial wealth.
Convergence and its underlying factors
Convergence across countries of the weight of household financial assets relative to GDP might be the result of increasing financial integration and of the effort of some countries to reach, through reforms, a higher degree of financial development.
10 Some highlights are provided below.
Sigma-convergence measures whether countries tend to become more similar in terms of deviation from the benchmark over time. We measured sigma-convergence using the standard deviation of the logarithm of the ratio of household financial assets to GDP (Figure 7a ). In 1980 the standard deviation of the indicator was around 15 per cent, while in 2008 it decreased to around 10 per cent.
Figure 7a. Sigma-convergence of financial assets to GDP ratio (percentages)
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Since 2008, if the convergence process has not gone into reverse, it has certainly come to a halt. It is therefore interesting to look at tests of significance. We conducted a Chow test, commonly used to assess whether time series have significant break points. These are illustrated in Figure 7b , where a 5 per cent significance threshold was used. As readers can see for themselves there is a significant break point at the beginning of the 1990s. In those years, the liberalization of capital flows was expanded by many countries, for instance in the UK and Italy. It is also probable that European directives on the harmonization of banking regulation and the 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 1
Another factor behind long-term convergence may be related to private pensions. Continental European countries had, at the beginning of the period, very strong first pillar social security systems as well as unfunded second pillar pay-as-you-go arrangements. In the same countries, first pillar replacement rates have been gradually diminishing, while governments have provided incentives for second and third pillar fully funded complementary insurance and retirement systems. The development of such vehicles has been a constant of the period.
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Using the same data set on household assets analyzed in this paper, Bruno, De Bonis and Silvestrini (2012) found beta-convergence for total financial wealth, shares and insurance products. This result may be interpreted as a confirmation of the increasing importance of capital markets all over the developed world. In contrast, mixed results -and often no convergencewere obtained for debt securities and deposits due to differences across countries in the weight of national public debts and the role of banks.
Next we asked whether the evolution of the ratio of financial assets to GDP has been smooth or has proceeded through "break points". 12 In Figure 8 Chow tests are extended to the evolution of the stock of household financial assets in single countries. Breaks occur between the late 1980s and early 1990s, consistent with the sigma-convergence detected in the previous section. In those years financial innovation accelerated, with measures of capital movement liberalization, greater monetary integration experiments in Europe, strong growth in the institutional investment industries, and buoyant securities markets in an era of disinflation and growth. Other breaks are detected around the second half of the 1990s in European countries, probably reflecting common steps and reforms aimed at the creation of the euro area. Again, as already remarked in the case of sigma convergence, the crisis of 2007-2008 did not imply significant breaks.
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Household liabilities and net financial wealth
A large literature has investigated the factors that may influence household indebtedness. Religion and cultural and social norms may influence individual attitudes towards debt (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2003) . Countries with a high household saving rate might have low indebtedness (and vice versa, see the UK and US) but this is not always true, as testified to by the experience of Spain and Japan. A period of low interest rates may favour the growth of household debt, together with a large tax deductibility of interest payments (in the Netherlands household debt reached a staggering 130 per cent of GDP because interest payments on mortgages are fully deductible). Household debt dynamics are also interconnected with trends in real estate prices (see Section 7). Financial innovation may influence debt, enlarging the menu of loan contracts and the combination of fixed and variable interest rates. The existence of the mortgage equity withdrawal mechanism was probably the major financial innovation influencing mortgages (Greenspan and Kennedy 2007 and the Bank of England 2003) . Finally, in countries like Italy the low efficiency of loan guarantee recovery procedures in the event of debtor insolvency may have negatively affected the attitude of banks towards granting mortgages. Figure 9 shows household liabilities -mainly represented by loans received from banks and other intermediaries -relative to GDP. In the 1980s household debt increased slowly in all the main OECD countries. With reference to its levels, debt was already high in Japan, Canada, the US, and, rather surprisingly, Germany. Indebtedness was lower in the UK and particularly low in France, Spain and Italy. This picture did not undergo major changes in the 1990s: for the entire decade the ratio of debt to GDP was more stable compared to the growth of financial assets that characterized the years of the dotcom bubble.
By contrast, since the early 2000s the picture has changed dramatically. Exploiting credit availability, low interest rates and financial innovation like mortgage equity withdrawal, household debt grew considerably in the UK, the US and Canada. More importantly, household indebtedness -linked to the real estate price bubble -exploded in Spain. Economic stagnation determined a slowdown of debt in Japan. Debt was also sluggish in Germany while it continued to increase in France and Italy.
The crisis of 2007-2008 interrupted the growth of debt in the UK, the US and Spain. France and Italy are two exceptions, because debt relative to GDP went on increasing in recent years too, while remaining at one of the lowest levels by international standards. In 2011 household liabilities were more than 100 per cent of GDP in the UK, and around 90 per cent of GDP in the US, Canada, and Spain; on the contrary debt was less than 60 per cent of GDP in Italy.
Until the financial crisis of 2007-2008 the growth of household debt was considered a key component of the "great moderation" interpretation of the evolution of many economies. The sub-prime crisis in the US, and the instability due to high household indebtedness in many countries, implied a reversal of the idea of a positive association between economic growth and household debt. Koo (2011 and underlined that the world is in a balance sheet recession analogous to that which hit the Japanese economy in the 1990s: in the years to come, despite very low interest rates the private sector of industrial nations will go on minimizing debt. Also, according to the OECD (2012), when private debt levels are high recessions are typically longer and deeper; the large costs associated with high debt recessions support the adoption of policies to prevent an excessive build-up of debt. In fact, central banks and international organizations have put in the policy agenda a strict monitoring of household (and firm) debt. For instance, private debt is among the indicators selected by the European Commission Alert Mechanism (European Commission 2011 and . The IMF noted that, historically, the growth of household debt in the run-up to a bust implies weak growth in the years that follow (IMF 2012) . According to the most extreme academic views, debt is viewed as pollution: it imposes costs on other agents that the borrowers fail to take into account (Jeanne and Korinek, 2010 ) and a better allocation of resources would be gained by introducing a tax on debt (Bianchi and Mendoza, 2010) . Even if we do not share this extreme, negative view of debt, it is probable that household deleveraging will continue in the years to come in most industrial countries. 
Household real assets
Household real assets are greater than financial assets in most OECD countries (two notable exceptions are the US and Japan). Therefore the analysis of household wealth must include a focus on real assets, whose changes are crucial for their consequences on the economy and for financial stability concerns (see de Bandt, Knetsch, Penalosa and Zollino 2010 for a comprehensive picture). Strong differences exist among countries in the ratio of real assets to GDP (Figure 11 ; per capita figures broadly confirm the gaps between nations).
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Spain is a case apart as far as the weight of real assets is concerned. Real wealth was already considerable in the 1990s, probably reflecting the low investment of individuals in financial products discussed in Section 2. This position of predominance was exacerbated by the boom in house prices in Spain that lasted from the early 2000s until 2007. According to the latest available figures, in Spain the ratio of household real assets to GDP is greater than 5.
In Italy, France and the UK this ratio is between 3 and 4. In Italy the importance of real assets is ascribable to many structural and short-term factors. The social role of the family is peculiar to Italy and this influences intergenerational transfers of assets, notably of houses. In the 1970s and the 1980s houses were seen as safe investments against inflation, in the years when financial markets were still underdeveloped. Housing was considered part of the retirement strategy of an ageing population, worried by the reforms of the public pension system (these reforms were actually completed in 2011). The stock market difficulties in the years 2000-2003 and the crisis of mutual funds from 2000 until recent years have stimulated housing demand. The imperfections in the market for rented property have probably also animated house purchases. Nobili and Zollino (2012) estimated that since the end of the 1980s house prices in Italy have reacted positively to an increase in household disposable income, demographic pressures, monetary easing and credit supply.
Turning to the UK, since the early 2000s this country has experienced one of the sharpest increases in house prices in industrial countries. Taking into account an inelastic housing supply (OECD 2005) , demand was spatially concentrated, given the role of London as a business centre. In France too, the increase in house prices -similar in dimension to that of Spain -has been attributed to the strong concentration of inhabitants in Paris.
In Germany, Japan and Canada household real assets are lower than in the previously mentioned countries (around 2 times GDP). In Germany low house prices prevailed in the former East Germany and house prices remained stable until recent times in the whole country (prices started to expand only in 2012). Moreover, Germany has a large social housing sector and the owner-occupation rate is less than 50 per cent, a small percentage compared with other countries.
In Japan, general deflation and a sharp decline in land prices caused a decrease in national wealth during the 1990s. Japan is the only country where the ratio of household real wealth to GDP is today lower than fifteen years ago. A large literature has investigated the possible negative links between house prices and population ageing (see Takats 2010 ). The theme is traditionally under scrutiny in Japan (Iwaisako 2003).
As said above, household non-financial assets are lower in the US than in the other countries (1.3 times GDP). The US has an extremely low population density (about 30 people per kilometer), an abundance of cheap land, a relatively efficient rental market, high worker mobility, and, as discussed in Section 3, a very high participation rate in financial markets. These factors may have contributed, coeteris paribus, to low household real wealth. Between 1998 and 2006 soaring house prices were mainly a coastal phenomenon, affecting metropolitan areas where the supply of the new houses is often restricted; on the other hand, the increase in house prices left the internal states largely untouched (Glaeser, Gottlieb and Tobo 2012) . During the phase of increasing prices, household real assets in the US approached the levels of Japan but as soon as prices collapsed the value of real assets returned to the lowest ranking traditionally occupied by the US.
The dispersion of the ratio of household real wealth to GDP is today much larger than in the 1990s, confirming that since the early 2000s house price changes have differed across countries. 
Concluding remarks
The availability of longer-term time series for national financial accounts is an important tool for better understanding developments in household wealth. Our analysis may be summarized in five main points.
Financial deepening. In the last 30 years the importance of financial assets increased in all the selected OECD countries. This evolution may be split into six broad cycles: the quiet 1980s, when the growth of financial wealth was moderate apart from Japan; the boom in asset prices in the second half of the 1990s linked to the Internet expansion; the burst of the dotcom bubble from Why does the size of financial wealth differ across countries? Household gross financial assets are higher in the US, Japan, the UK and Canada; Italy is in an intermediate position, actually quite close to Canada, while Germany, France, and Spain occupy lower rankings. Even if there is no formal theory of the determinants of financial wealth, direct and indirect participation in financial markets, the extension of public pension schemes, the substitution effects with real assets, and the accumulation of saving and price effects, are among the key explanations of these differences. The link between saving and wealth is not direct: since the 1990s the propensity to save has diminished in most of the countries while price effects appear to have played a major The composition of financial wealth and convergence. In most OECD countries there was a trend towards commercial bank disintermediation, leading to a decreasing role of deposits in household wealth. Since the 1980s bank-based systems like those of France and Italy introduced reforms to increase the efficiency of the Stock Exchange, but holdings of shares declined following the two negative cycles of share prices in 2000-2003 and 2007-2008 . Life insurance and pension funds reported consistent growth in all the countries. There are signs of sigmaconvergence and beta-convergence for the incidence of financial wealth over GDP, shares and other equity and insurance technical reserves, but not for deposits and securities holdings. As said above, bank disintermediation was widespread but deposits remain central in Japan, Spain and Germany. In Italy 20 per cent of household wealth is invested in bonds, a much higher percentage than in other countries, due to the weight of State securities and bank bonds.
Household debt and net financial wealth. The growth of household debt before the financial crisis was seen as a way of improving inter-temporal allocation through the development of new contracts. More cautious considerations have subsequently been expressed because of the subprime crisis and the global recession. Household debt remains very high in the UK, Japan, Spain and the US, while it is smaller in the other countries. Thanks to low indebtedness levels, the net financial wealth of Italian households is very close to that of the English and Canadian ones; for Spanish households net financial wealth is lower than in all the other countries.
Household real assets. In view of the interrelations between economic activity, financial stability, consumption and changes in house prices, there is a wide policy debate on the monitoring of the value of house wealth. In Europe Spain is a special case with its large household debt linked to the very high level of real assets. Household real wealth is also important in France, Italy and the UK. Real assets are lower in Japan, in large part caused by the bursting of the housing bubble in the 1980s; in Germany, where private ownership of houses is low; in Canada, and especially in the US.
Given the existence of relevant endogeneity issues, we plan to extend the analysis by looking more deeply at determinants of aggregate household assets and debt. We leave these econometric exercises to further research.
Conversion table
In order to merge data from the two sources, we have constructed the following conversion table to obtain a good degree of correspondence both over time and across the majority of the countries analyzed: USA -The US started publishing financial accounts in the 1950s (see De Bonis and Gigliobianco 2012) . The financial accounts data are taken from the publication Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, edited by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. In the definition of the institutional sectors, the data on households (households and non-profit organizations) do not include artisan firms, which are included in the statistics on nonfinancial businesses. The reaction of the United States to the OECD project has been to provide the OECD with long times-series from 1950 to 2011.
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